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Main document 
A Hybrid Methodology for the EU Principle of Consistent Interpretation 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the legal methodology that courts have to employ when they construe 
domestic law in accordance with European Union directives. It demonstrates that the CJEU has 
set up autonomous “European methodological rules”. These rules apply together with national 
legal methods. The relationship between both regimes can be described with the concepts of 
overlapping, intervention and Europeanisation from the inside. The article thus holds that the 
doctrine of consistent interpretation possesses a hybrid methodology. The reanalysis of the 
CJEU’s case law offers answers to some unresolved questions. The article shows how 
consistent interpretation affects national principles of interpretation. It demonstrates the extent 
to which domestic judges are required to depart from traditional methods of construction and 
to what extent European methodological rules broaden the limits of the judicial function as 
accepted under national law. The contra legem limit is defined and some of its 
misinterpretations in legal scholarship are highlighted. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The duty of judges to interpret domestic law in accordance with EU directives has stepped out 
of the shadow of direct effect and supremacy into the limelight of European Union law. What 
started as a tool that remedies the absence of a directly effective provision in a directive1 is now 
considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the first port of call to 
                                                 
1 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83) [1984] E.C.R. 1891; [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430 at [21]-
[27]; Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH (Case 79/83) [1984] E.C.R. 1921 at [21]-[27]. 
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ensure the effectiveness of a directive and to resolve inconsistencies between national 
legislation and a directive.2 Yet, consistent interpretation still presents unresolved interpretative 
challenges: How does it affect domestic principles of statutory interpretation? Does it require 
judges to depart from traditional principles of construction and if so, to what extent? Does it 
extend the limits of the judicial function as accepted under national law? What are its 
interpretative limits? Case law of domestic courts is regularly preoccupied with these question. 
The current literature on the methodology of consistent interpretation can roughly be grouped 
into two strands. Some academics argue that a judge is required to construe domestic legislation 
within the scope of a directive solely on the basis of national legal standards.3 Other scholars 
claim that the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation affects and limits, to a certain extent, 
domestic rules of construction.4 Yet, these scholars do not explain how, exactly to what extent, 
and why this happens.5 
This article answers these open questions. It takes the fragments of a European 
methodological standard for consistent interpretation from the case law of the CJEU and puts 
them into a coherent framework labelled European methodological rules. These rules interact 
                                                 
2 Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique (C-282/10) EU:C:2012:33; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 14 at [23] and 
[32]; Amia SpA (in liquidation) v Provincia Regionale di Palermo (C-97/11) EU:C:2012:306; [2012] 3 C.M.L.R. 16 at [30]-
[32]; Spedition Welter GmbH v Avanssur SA (C-306/12) EU:C:2013:650; [2014] R.T.R. 5 at [27]-[28]. 
3 C.-W. Canaris, “Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung im System der juristischen Methodenlehre” in 
H. Koziol and P. Rummel (eds.), Festschrift für Franz Bydlinski (Vienna: Springer, 2002), p.103 at pp.57, 61 and 91; C. 
Herresthal, Rechtsfortbildung im europarechtlichen Bezugsrahmen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), pp.54-55 and 63; M. Weber, 
Grenzen EU-rechtskonformer Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), pp.106, 126, 213, 215. 
4 A.I.L. Campbell, “National legislation and EC directives: Judicial co-operation and national autonomy” (1992) 43 Northern 
Ireland Law Quarterly 330, 343; M. Klamert, “Judicial implementation of directives and anticipatory indirect effect: 
connecting the dots” (2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 1251, 1257; S. Prechal, Directives in EC law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 
pp.199, 209. 
5 For a noteworthy exception (in German) see W.-H. Roth and C. Jopen, “§ 13 Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung” in K. 
Riesenhuber (ed.), Europäische Methodenlehre, 3rd ed. (Munich: De Gruyter, 2015), § 13 at [25]-[37]. 
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with national rules of statutory construction resulting in a hybrid methodology. The article 
resolves the seeming paradox that the CJEU can refer to domestic standards and at the same 
time intervene in the methodology of consistent interpretation by stipulating European 
methodological rules. The article also refers to judgments of English6 and German courts to 
assess whether Member States’ courts apply and accept European methodological rules. 
The remainder of the article will be structured as follows. Part two discusses the 
principle of equivalence and its shortcomings to guarantee the effectiveness of directives. The 
third part revisits the CJEU’s case law on consistent interpretation and outlines European 
methodological rules. Part four examines the meaning of the contra legem limit of consistent 
interpretation and resolves some misunderstandings about it. The fifth part provides a 
theoretical framework for the relationship between European methodological rules and national 
principles of statutory construction. Based on this relationship, part six submits that the 
principle of consistent interpretation has a hybrid methodology. The article concludes with a 
summary. 
 
2. PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE 
It is settled case law since the CJEU’s Grand Chamber judgment in Pfeiffer that domestic courts 
can apply their “interpretative methods recognised by national law” when they interpret 
domestic law in conformity with a directive.7 Yet, Pfeiffer did not leave national rules of 
construction untouched. The German Law at issue was adopted in order to transpose the 
                                                 
6 The term „English courts“ will be used to refer to the courts of England and Wales and the term “English law” will be used 
to refer to the legal system governing England and Wales. The effect of the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation on 
English law as described in this article remains the same as long as the European Communities Act 1972 is in force and the 
UK is a member of the EU. 
7 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Kreisverband Waldshut eV (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835; [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 44 at 
[116]. 
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Working Time Directive 93/104. S. 3 of the German Law on working time restricted weekly 
working time to 48 hours on average. By way of derogation from s. 3, a collective agreement 
could extend working time beyond 10 hours per day, where working time regularly includes 
significant periods of duty time (s. 7(1)(i) of the German Law on working time). When the case 
was referred to the CJEU, it held that national legislation which authorises weekly working 
time in excess of 48 hours by means of a collective agreement, including periods of duty time, 
is incompatible with art. 6(2) of the Working Time Directive.8 Thus, s. 3 of the German Law 
on working time read on its own complied with EU law, whereas s. 7(1)(i) did not.9 Regarding 
the duty of consistent interpretation, the CJEU held that  
 
“if the application of interpretative methods recognised by national law enables, in 
certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to 
avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law or the scope of that provision to be 
restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule 
concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the 
result sought by the directive.”10  
 
In effect, the CJEU asked the referring German court to look for and apply a national rule of 
construction which restricts the scope of s. 7(1)(i) so that s. 3 of the German Law on working 
time applies to the case at issue. 
                                                 
8 Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [94]-[95] and [100]-[101]. 
9 See Opinion of A.G. Colomer in Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [21], [39], [45]. 
10 Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [116]. See also Mono Car Styling SA v Dervis Odemis (C-12/08) [2009] 
E.C.R. I-6653; [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 47 at [62]. 
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What the CJEU also demands in this part of its ruling is that a national court must not 
fall short of applying the same range of interpretative rules for consistent interpretation that is 
available to the court when it construes purely domestic law (principle of equivalence).11 The 
principle of equivalence refers back to national legal methods. It rests on the principle that 
cases affected by EU law must not be treated less favourably than similar domestic cases 
without an EU law element. It is submitted that what the Court expressed in rather cryptic terms 
in Pfeiffer goes even beyond the principle of equivalence. Paragraph 116 of the ruling cited 
above can be read in the following way: if the application of methods of interpretation 
recognised by national law leads to a possible directive-consistent meaning of the legislation, 
e.g. a restriction of the scope of s. 7(1)(i) of the German law on working time, the domestic 
court must apply these methods and choose the directive-consistent meaning. Choosing this 
meaning becomes an obligation under the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation if this is 
necessary to reach the result sought by the directive.12 This reading of Pfeiffer privileges EU 
law and goes beyond the non-discrimination rationale inherent in the principle of equivalence. 
It implies a priority rule which will be discussed in the next part of this article. Pfeiffer clarified 
that a national court is required to fully exhaust its methodological latitude and to use every 
interpretative tool available in order to identify a directive-consistent meaning.13 It must do 
“whatever lies within its jurisdiction”.14 This also means that a court must not fall short of the 
                                                 
11 S. Perner, EU-Richtlinien und Privatrecht (Vienna: Manz, 2012), p.82; J. Schürnbrand, “Die Grenzen richtlinienkonformer 
Rechtsfortbildung im Privatrecht” (2007) JuristenZeitung 910, 912-913. 
12 Cf. S. Prechal, “Case note on Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al., judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 5 October 2004” (2005) 42 C.M.L. Rev. 1445, 1458. 
13 See also BP Europa v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt (C-64/15) EU:C:2016:62 at [41] (“[...] when national courts apply 
domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, to the fullest extent possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive concerned [...]” – italics added). 
14 Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [118]. 
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outer limits of conventional rules of statutory interpretation recognised in the domestic legal 
system when it construes legislation in accordance with a directive. If a court can restrict or 
extend the scope of an enactment against or beyond its wording under national law (judicial 
law-making), the court is bound to use those methods if it is necessary to meet the requirements 
of the directive. 
The principle of equivalence cannot prevent that different legal methodologies for 
consistent interpretation in different Member States threaten the full effectiveness and uniform 
application of directives in the Union. What is possible as a matter of construction in one legal 
system may not be possible in another one.15 This may be the reason why the CJEU does not 
restrict its case law on the methodology of consistent interpretation to a reference to national 
legal standards. 
 
3. EUROPEAN METHODOLOGICAL RULES 
Even though the CJEU does not make the case for a common European methodology for the 
interpretation of harmonised domestic legislation,16 the Court has developed European 
methodological rules which interact with national principles of statutory construction.17 These 
                                                 
15 Prechal, “Case note” (2005) 42 C.M.L. Rev. 1445, 1459; S. Vogenauer, “Eine gemeineuropäische Methodenlehre des Rechts 
– Plädoyer und Programm” (2005) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 234, 238, 242-243, 259 footnote 117. For a detailed 
discussion see M. Brenncke, “Europäisierung der Methodik richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfindung” (2015) 50 Europarecht 440, 
443-444. 
16 In favour of such a legal methodology: Vogenauer, “Eine gemeineuropäische Methodenlehre des Rechts” (2005) Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privatrecht 234, 242-243, 259-260, 262. Against such a legal methodology: Brenncke, “Europäisierung der 
Methodik richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfindung” (2015) 50 Europarecht 440, 445. 
17 For scholars recognising a trend towards a Europeanisation of consistent interpretation see Brenncke, “Europäisierung der 
Methodik richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfindung” (2015) 50 Europarecht 440, 446-451; O. Mörsdorf, “Unmittelbare Anwendung 
von EG-Richtlinien zwischen Privaten in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH” (2009) 44 Europarecht, 219, 230; Roth and Jopen, 
“§ 13 Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung” in Europäische Methodenlehre (2015), § 13 at [26], [28], [45]. 
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rules set an EU-wide standard, but they do not provide for a complete methodological order. 
Outside their limited scope, national principles apply and govern the methodology of consistent 
interpretation. The European methodological rules are committed to the full effectiveness of 
directives and to improving the uniform application of directives in the EU. 
 
A. Interpretative priority of the directive-consistent meaning 
The CJEU has required in Chamber and Grand Chamber rulings that a domestic court must 
favour the interpretation of the national legislation which is the most consistent with the result 
sought by the directive in order to thereby achieve an outcome compatible with the provisions 
of the directive. The Court has applied this methodological rule to legislation pre-dating or 
post-dating an applicable directive.18 What the CJEU requires is in effect that the interpretative 
result (meaning) which complies with a directive must be given priority over all other possible 
but inconsistent meanings. The reasoning of the CJEU does not indicate that the priority rule 
itself influences how a judge arrives at possible meanings of an enactment. Whether or not an 
enactment is capable of bearing more than one meaning is not governed by this rule, but by 
other principles of statutory construction, in particular, the interpretative criteria. Nor does the 
priority rule influence how a judge weighs conflicting interpretative criteria recognised by 
domestic law. It does not give precedence to a specific interpretative criterion and does not 
exclude a weighing of the interpretative criteria, but requires a judge to choose a possible 
                                                 
18 Océano Grupo Editorial v Rocío Murciano Quintero (C-240/98) [2000] I-4941; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 43 at [32]; Adeneler v 
Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-6057; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 30 at [124]; Magoora v Dyrektor Izby 
Skarbowej w Krakowie (C-414/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-10921; [2011] B.V.C. 325 at [43]-[44]; CoNISMa v Regione Marche (C-
305/08) [2009] I-12129 at [50]. See also Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Mono Car Styling (C-12/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-6653 at 
[107]. 
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interpretative result that complies with the directive.19 It is immaterial if other potentially 
weightier arguments lead to another possible meaning of the enactment which infringes the 
directive. It is implicit in the CJEU’s reasoning that the interpretative priority rule only applies 
once a statutory provision is at all open to interpretation and can be given more than one 
possible meaning, one of which fulfils the requirements of a directive. Therefore, the priority 
rule is limited to a selection rule between different possible meanings of an enactment. 
The CJEU does not refer back to domestic principles of construction in order to justify 
the interpretative priority rule. Instead, it prescribes this methodological rule to courts in the 
Member States. It is therefore immaterial whether and under which circumstances such a 
priority rule also exists in national law. The German Federal Constitutional Court has accepted 
the European origin of this rule.20 English courts also give interpretative priority to a directive-
consistent meaning of an enactment but they have not yet explicitly clarified whether this is 
due to a national or European priority rule.21 
 
B. Presumption of compliance 
A second European methodological rule is the presumption that the domestic legislature 
intended to transpose the directive fully and correctly into national law (presumption of 
compliance). The national court must “presume” that the Member State “had the intention of 
                                                 
19 For a different view see T. Henninger, Europäisches Privatrecht und Methode (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), p.312 and 
Roth and Jopen, “§ 13 Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung” in Europäische Methodenlehre (2015), § 13 at [26] (precedence 
to an interpretative criterion). 
20 Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], judgment of 26 September 2011, (2012) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 669 at [46]. 
21 See, e.g. Alderson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] EWCA Civ. 1767 at [27] (Lord Phillips MR). 
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fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned”.22 Again, the CJEU 
prescribes this methodological rule to Member States’ courts irrespective of whether or not 
such a presumption also exists under domestic rules of construction. English23 and German24 
courts have already applied the European presumption of compliance. Contrary to the 
interpretative priority rule, the presumption of compliance influences how a judge arrives at 
possible meanings of an enactment and bears upon the range of possible meanings. It interacts 
with other (national) principles of statutory construction like the historical and purposive 
approach.25 In effect, the presumption of compliance works as a dynamic reference to the 
objectives of the applicable directive as construed by the CJEU. It prevents conflicts in 
Europe’s multi-level system by aligning the intention of the domestic legislature with the 
intention of the European legislature. 
 
(i) Scope of application 
The CJEU has so far required national courts to employ the presumption of compliance in two 
situations. On the one hand, the Grand Chamber in Pfeiffer demonstrates that the presumption 
applies to the interpretation of legislation which is specifically enacted for the purpose of 
                                                 
22 Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [112]. See also Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (C-334/92) 
[1993] E.C.R. I-6911; [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 at [20]. 
23 British Gas Trading Ltd. v Lock [2016] EWCA Civ 983 at [107] (Sir Colin Rimer, with whom Gloster LJ and Sir Terence 
Etherton MR agreed); Bear Scotland v Fulton [2015] I.C.R. 221 (Employment Appeal Tribunal) at [46], [64] (Langstaff J). 
24 Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 24 March 2009, (2009) Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 465 at [58]-[59] – Schultz-Hoff; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 7 May 2014, 
(2014) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2646 at [23] – Lebensversicherung II. 
25 See Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 7 May 2014, (2014) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2646 at 
[23] – Lebensversicherung II for the statement that the EU presumption of compliance needs to be taken into account when 
determining the purpose of an implementing provision.    
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transposing a directive into domestic law.26 On the other hand, the presumption applies to the 
interpretation of legislation pre-dating a directive if the Member State does not consider it 
necessary to amend its law in order to bring it into line with the applicable directive because it 
(mistakenly) considers the pre-existing legislation to already satisfy the requirements of the 
directive concerned, which was the case in the CJEU’s Fifth Chamber ruling in Wagner 
Miret.27 The key significance of the presumption is that a court must assume that the national 
legislature intended to comply entirely with the requirements of the directive.28 The main case 
of the application of the presumption thus occurs when the legislature transposes a directive 
into domestic law without clarifying that specific substantive objectives in the implementing 
act comply with the directive. Since it must be assumed that the legislature intended to 
implement the directive entirely, a court which interprets a specific statutory provision of the 
implementing act must assume that the legislature had the intention to only enact consistent 
objectives. 
Despite some scholarly opinion to the contrary,29 the presumption is not universal and 
does only apply to a certain range of cases. So far, the CJEU has only relied on the presumption 
in cases where there was an actual indication of legislative intent to comply with the 
requirements of the directive with regard to the legislation under construction. For 
implementing legislation in particular, the presumption can be linked with the actual intention 
                                                 
26 Pfeiffer (C-397-403/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-8835 at [112]. 
27 Wagner Miret (C-334/92) [1993] E.C.R. I-6911 at [4], [5], [21]. Note that in para. 21 of the judgment in its English version, 
the words “a national court” should be read as meaning “a Member State”. This reading is supported by the authentic Spanish 
version as well as the French and German language versions. 
28 See, e.g., British Gas Trading Ltd. v Lock [2016] EWCA Civ 983 at [107] (Sir Colin Rimer, with whom Gloster LJ and Sir 
Terence Etherton MR agreed). 
29 N. Baldauf, Richtlinienverstoß und Verschiebung der Contra-legem-Grenze im Privatrechtsverhältnis (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2013), pp.91, 99. 
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of the enacting legislature to transpose the directive into domestic law. Authorial intent did not 
form the base of the presumption in Wagner Miret. Instead, the CJEU seems to have relied on 
the view of a subsequent national legislature that the provisions already in force met the 
requirements of the directive. Yet, the grounds of the judgment in Wagner Miret are not clear 
in this respect, which is regrettable as this issue touches on sensitive methodological and 
constitutional debates in the Member States about the correct object of statutory interpretation 
and in particular about whether the notion of legislative intent must be understood in a historical 
or contemporary sense. 
This article distinguishes between (a) situations where there is no indication of 
legislative intent to comply with the directive with regard to the legislation under construction 
and the presumption does not apply and (b) situations where such intent is present and the 
presumption applies, but the presumption may be rebutted. Based on this distinction, the 
following three situations fall outside the current scope of the presumption. First, it does not 
apply if the legislature inadvertently did not transpose the directive into domestic law at all, so 
that no intention to comply is discernible. Second, the presumption does not apply if the 
legislature deliberately refuses to implement the directive into national law. Third, a domestic 
court is not obliged to apply the presumption for the interpretation of pre-existing national 
legislation if the legislature neither amended the pre-existing legislation in order to implement 
the directive nor considered the pre-existing legislation to already satisfy the requirements of 
the directive.30 This is the case even if the legislature implemented the directive elsewhere in 
                                                 
30 Such were the cases in Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 17 November 2009, (2010) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1020 at [26]-[27], [30], [46] – Urlaubsentgelt and Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], 
judgment of 16 May 2013, (2013) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2674 at [36], [40], [42]-[43]. Neither the 
Bundesarbeitsgericht nor the Bundesgerichtshof applied the presumption of compliance. In both cases, the German courts 
argued that the national law could not be interpreted in conformity with the directive concerned since such an interpretation 
would have surpassed the contra legem limit. 
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the national law. This reading of the case law is supported by the CJEU’s Grand Chamber 
decision in Kücükdeveci. The main proceedings involved the interpretation of s. 622(2) of the 
German Civil Code. The provision preceded the applicable Directive 2000/78/EC as it 
originated in a German law of 1926. The Court of Justice did not raise the presumption of 
compliance in Kücükdeveci even though Directive 2000/78/EC was transposed into German 
law by the General Law on Equal Treatment. It accepted the construction of the German Court 
that s. 622(2), having regard to its clear wording and its objectives as pursued by the enacting 
legislature, is incapable of an interpretation in conformity with Directive 2000/78/EC.31  
 
(ii) Rebuttal of the presumption 
The question of whether or not the presumption applies must be differentiated from the rebuttal 
of the presumption.32 The presumption can be negated by evidence to the contrary, for example, 
by showing that the national legislature intended to depart from specific provisions of the 
directive. Hence, the presumption is rebutted if the legislature implements the directive in 
general but deliberately decides to keep or enact an inconsistent specific objective. How, then, 
must the legislature express such an intention? Does this intention have to be plain from the 
wording of the enactment or does it suffice if this intention can be discerned using the whole 
body of interpretative criteria recognised by domestic law? In other words, can the presumption 
only be rebutted by express words or also by implication? In the absence of CJEU case law on 
the matter, this question is governed by national legal methods.33 It is submitted here that the 
presumption of compliance can only be rebutted if a national court reaches an outer limit of 
                                                 
31 Kücükdeveci v Swedex (C-555/07) [2010] E.C.R. I-365; [2010] 2 C.M.L.R. 33 at [16], [34]-[35], [49]. 
32 It is implicit in the CJEU’s case law that the presumption is rebuttable. See Wagner Miret (C-334/92) [1993] E.C.R. I-6911 
at [20], [22]. 
33 This is an example of the hybrid conception of the methodology of consistent interpretation. 
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consistent interpretation which bars the directive-consistent meaning. That means that the 
ultimate answer to the question of how the presumption of compliance can be refuted is to be 
found in the contra legem limit of consistent interpretation, which will be explored in the next 
part of this article. 
A case in support of this argument is Impact where the CJEU referred quite extensively 
to Pfeiffer but did not raise the presumption of compliance. Ireland transposed Directive 
1999/70/EC belatedly into national law and the question arose whether the domestic court was 
under an obligation, by virtue of the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation, to give the 
relevant implementing provision a retrospective effect to the date by which the directive should 
have been transposed. That would have resulted in the imposition of a civil liability on Ireland, 
in its capacity as an employer, for acts or omissions which occurred at a time when that 
directive ought to have been transposed by Ireland. The domestic enactment in question (s. 6 
Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003) was specifically enacted for the 
purpose of transposing Directive 1999/70/EC. Its wording did not expressly preclude an 
interpretation with a retrospective effect. Under Irish rules of statutory construction, however, 
a strong presumption exists which precludes the retrospective application of legislation unless 
there is a clear and unambiguous indication to the contrary. The Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
held that unless the domestic court found such an indication, the EU legal duty of consistent 
interpretation does not require the court to apply the domestic provision retrospectively because 
such an obligation would require the court to infringe the contra legem limit.34 
 
                                                 
34 Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others (C-268/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2483; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 47 at [102]-
[103]. 
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(iii) Inadvertent inconsistencies with EU law 
The European presumption of compliance can have far-reaching consequences in the event that 
the legislative history of an implementing act contains inadvertent inconsistencies with EU 
law. This can occur if (a) a specific objective of an enactment is expressed in the legislative 
history but contradicts the directive’s requirements as subsequently interpreted by the CJEU 
and (b) there is no indication that the legislature realised the inconsistency. The Member State 
has thus erred with regard to the correct construction of the directive’s requirements. This 
scenario has exasperated German courts35 and has also featured in the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales.36 Whether or not the presumption of compliance is rebutted in this scenario 
would prima facie be determined by national law. Yet, the answer to this question is provided 
by EU law as the following discussion shows. 
The decisive case is Björnekulla. The main proceedings concerned the interpretation of 
art. 25 of the Swedish Trade Marks Law 1960:644 which provides that a trade mark may be 
revoked if it no longer has a distinctive character. The provision had been amended in order to 
implement Directive 89/104/EEC. The question arose about which classes of persons are 
relevant in determining whether a trade mark has lost its distinctive character. The Swedish 
Svea Court of Appeal argued that the relevant classes of persons are those who deal 
commercially with the product if the Swedish Trade Marks Law is construed on the basis of 
the travaux préparatoires.37 Since the Svea Court of Appeal was uncertain whether such an 
interpretation is consistent with the underlying directive, it referred to the CJEU the question 
                                                 
35 Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 26 November 2008, (2009) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 427 
at [25] – Quelle II; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 21 December 2011, (2012) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1073 at [33]-[36] – Weber II; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 7 May 2014, (2014) 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2646 at [23], [26] – Lebensversicherung II. 
36 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] EWCA Civ 1708 at [50]-[52] (Etherton LJ). 
37 Björnekulla Fruktindustrier v Procordia Food (C-371/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-5791; [2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 16 at [10]. 
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of the correct meaning of art. 12(2)(a) of Directive 89/104/EEC. The CJEU held that the 
relevant classes of persons are not restricted to those who deal with that product commercially 
but also comprise consumers and end users.38 The Svea Court of Appeal’s interpretation was 
thus incompatible with the requirements of the applicable directive. However, the wording of 
art. 25 of the Swedish Trade Marks Law was not clear and the provision was thus open to other 
possible constructions.39 Regarding consistent interpretation, the Sixth Chamber of the CJEU 
stipulated that a national court has to construe domestic law in conformity with an applicable 
directive “notwithstanding any contrary interpretation which may arise from the travaux 
préparatoires for the national rule”.40 
Assuming that the Swedish law could have been given another (consistent) meaning 
according to national legal methods, the reasoning of the Sixth Chamber in Björnekulla 
illustrates the European interpretative priority rule. The reasoning of the CJEU can also be used 
to elucidate the European presumption of compliance: possible inconsistent meanings of an 
enactment which may arise from the travaux préparatoires generally do not rebut the 
presumption that the legislature intended to enact only consistent objectives. Hence, the 
presumption of compliance itself contains an element of priority: the presumed general 
intention of the legislature to fully implement the directive prevails over a specific but 
inadvertently inconsistent objective of a particular enactment which is expressed in the travaux 
préparatoires. Resolving the contradiction between the general and the specific intention is not 
left to national rules of construction or to the discretion of the domestic court, but prescribed 
by EU law. To note, this has not yet been confirmed by a Grand Chamber judgment.41 
                                                 
38 Björnekulla (C-371/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-5791 at [25]-[26]. 
39 Cf. Björnekulla (C-371/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-5791 at [10]. 
40 Björnekulla (C-371/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-5791 at [13]. 
41 The system of chambers at the Court of Justice has the potential to lead to divergent lines of case law within the CJEU; see 
P. de Sousa, The European fundamental freedoms: A contextual approach (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p.42. See also M. Malecki, 
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The priority element of the presumption of compliance can have a significant impact 
on national legal methodology. Let us assume that in some Member State specific objectives 
of an enactment expressed in the legislative history cannot be overridden by a (presumed) 
general intention of the legislature without breaching the contra legem limit. Specific 
legislative intent is given priority over general intentions of the legislature according to national 
legal methodology.42 It follows that a specific objective which inadvertently contradicts a 
directive-consistent meaning would rebut the presumption of compliance if the presumption 
were without the priority element. This would lead to the result that the inconsistent meaning 
is the only possible meaning of the enactment. In such a case, the interpretative priority rule 
would not apply. If the presumption of compliance contains the priority element, however, the 
presumption is not rebutted and a consistent interpretation remains possible. In this example, 
the presumption of compliance intervenes in national legal methods and provides for a 
constitutionally significant shift of the contra legem limit in the Member State. 
What remains open is the demarcation line between an inadvertent inconsistency with 
EU law and a deliberate intention to contradict or refuse to implement a certain provision of a 
directive. As the EU presumption of compliance currently stands, Member State legal 
methodologies determine where this line is to be drawn. This distinction was not discussed in 
Björnekulla since the travaux préparatoires in that case did not suggest that the Swedish 
                                                 
“Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments of chambers” (2012) 
19 Journal of European Public Policy 59, 61, 63, who found evidence of systemic variation of outcomes attributable to chamber 
composition. 
42 In Germany and in Austria for example, some scholars assert that if the specific objective of a particular enactment as 
expressed in the legislative history of the statute contradicts the legislature’s general intention to transpose the directive into 
national law, the former prevails over the latter under German/Austrian legal methodology; see, e.g. P. Bydlinski, 
“Richtlinienkonforme “gesetzesübersteigende” Rechtsfindung und ihre Grenzen – eine methodische Vergewisserung 
anlässlich 20 Jahre EU-Mitgliedschaft” (2015) 137 Juristische Blätter 2, 8; M. Franzen, “„Heininger“ und die Folgen: ein 
Lehrstück zum Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht”, (2003) JuristenZeitung 321, 324, 328. 
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legislature specifically intended to contradict the directive. Therefore, the CJEU’s reasoning in 
Björnekulla leaves open the possibility that the enactment as interpreted in its context, which 
includes the travaux préparatoires, can only be given one meaning which does not comply 
with the directive since the legislature deliberately intended to depart from certain requirements 
of the directive. In this case, the contra legem limit of consistent interpretation is reached and 
the presumption of compliance is rebutted. 
 
4. THE CONTRA LEGEM LIMIT 
The European duty of consistent interpretation does not oblige43 a judge to construe national 
legislation contra legem.44 The contra legem limit has a functional meaning. It enshrines the 
principle that a judge is bound by statute. It provides, it is submitted, that a barrier exists which 
separates permissible judicial interpretation from impermissible judicial legislation which lies 
outside of a court’s jurisdiction.45 A contra legem construction surpasses the outer limits of the 
judicial function. The contra legem limit has a constitutional dimension and presupposes a 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. 
 
                                                 
43 See, e.g. Impact (C-268/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2483 at [103] (“[...] Community law [...] cannot be interpreted as requiring the 
referring court [...] to interpret national law contra legem.” – italics added). 
44 Adeneler (C-212/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-6057 at [110]; Impact (C-268/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2483 at [100]; Mono Car Styling 
(C-12/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-6653 at [61]; Angelidaki v Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Rethimnis (C-378-380/07) [2009] 
E.C.R. I-3071; [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 15 at [199]. 
45 Cf. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Dansk Industri (DI) v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen (C-441/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:776 at 
[76]-[77]; Campbell, “National legislation and EC directives” (1992) 43 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 330, 347; Conway, 
The limits of legal reasoning and the European Court of Justice (2012), p.14. 
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A. National and European limits of interpretation 
The existence of the contra legem limit alone does not reveal where the boundary actually lies, 
i.e. under which circumstances interpretation crosses the threshold to judicial legislation. 
English and German courts have amplified this limit with certain interpretative rules such as 
that a consistent interpretation cannot depart from a fundamental feature of the legislation.46 
After Marleasing,47 confusion arose about whether at all, and if so, to what extent the duty of 
consistent interpretation can be restricted by national methods of interpretation.48 In later case 
law, the CJEU has recognised that a consistent interpretation of domestic legislation can fail 
due to limits imposed by national legal methodology.49 One example is Impact where rules of 
construction established in Irish law, in particular the presumption against retrospective 
application of legislation, determined the contra legem limit.50 Since national courts can 
principally apply their domestic principles of construction when they interpret domestic law in 
accordance with EU directives, the outer limits of consistent interpretation are principally 
                                                 
46 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 29 at [89]-[90] (Arden LJ); 
Vodafone 2 v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWCA Civ 446 at [38] (Sir Andrew Morritt, C); Vidal-Hall v 
Google Inc. [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [90] (Lord Dyson MR and Sharp LJ, with whom McFarlane LJ agreed). With regard to 
“conventional” judicial law-making in Germany see Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], judgment of 19 
March 2013, (2013) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1058 at [66]; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 
16 May 2013, (2013) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2674 at [27]. 
47 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación (C-106/89) [1990] E.C.R. I-4135; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 at [9], 
[13]. 
48 For an overview of the discussion see Campbell, “National legislation and EC directives” (1992) 43 Northern Ireland Law 
Quarterly 330, 346-352; Prechal, Directives in EC law (2005), pp.197-199. 
49 QDQ Media v Alejandro Omedas Lecha (C-235/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-1937; [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 55 at [14]-[15]; Impact (C-
268/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2483 at [95]-[104]; Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT (C-176/12) 
EU:C:2014:2; [2014] 2 C.M.L.R. 41 at [39]-[41]. 
50 Impact (C-268/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2483 at [102]-[103]. 
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determined by national (constitutional) law. Criticism51 that the CJEU has not yet further 
defined the contra legem limit is therefore unwarranted. Furthermore, it is incorrect to say that 
the contra legem limit as expressed by the CJEU implies that a provision cannot be given a 
meaning which (a) “clearly deviates from an initial (literal) reading of the provision[s] 
concerned”52 or (b) contradicts its “ordinary” meaning53. Such an understanding of the contra 
legem limit would infringe the principle of equivalence if judicial law-making, that is to say, 
the interpretation of a provision which goes beyond or against its wording, is possible and 
within the bounds of the judicial function of a Member State. If national legal methodology 
recognises that legislation can be construed against its ordinary meaning under specific 
circumstances, the contra legem limit does not bite if these circumstances are met. 
The contra legem limit is principally but not fully determined by domestic law.54 
National autonomy is confined by European methodological rules. The presumption of 
compliance in particular has the ability to influence, to “stretch” or to shift the contra legem 
limit.55 A hypothetical example of a shifting of the contra legem limit was given in the previous 
part of this article. European methodological rules thus have the potential to carry judges 
beyond the judicial function as accepted under their domestic legal order and to intervene in 
                                                 
51 See, e.g. C. Franklin, “Limits to the limits of the principle of consistent interpretation? Commentary on the Court’s decision 
in Spedition Welter” (2015) 40 E.L. Rev. 910, 923. 
52 Prechal, Directives in EC law (2005), p.207. 
53 D. Chalmers and G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p.320. 
54 For the view that the contra legem limit is solely determined by national law see Canaris, “Die richtlinienkonforme 
Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung im System der juristischen Methodenlehre” in Festschrift für Franz Bydlinski (2002), p.47 
at p.91; M. Klamert, “Richtlinienkonforme Auslegung und unmittelbare Wirkung von EG-Richtlinien in der Rechtsprechung 
der österreichischen Höchstgerichte” (2008) 130 Juristische Blätter 158, 160; cf. Revenue and Customs Commissioners v IDT 
Card Services Ireland Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 29 at [81] (Arden LJ). 
55 Cf. Prechal, Directives in EC law (2005), p.209 who asserts that the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation may imply 
for national courts the obligation to stretch the limits of their judicial function. 
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the national separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. A stretching of the 
contra legem limit has occurred in Germany.56 Under German law, the contra legem limit of 
(consistent) interpretation is surpassed when a court contravenes the wording of an enactment 
and the clearly identifiable intention of the legislature (the so-called ‘double criterion’).57 The 
legislative history of an implementing act, which is a permissible aid to statutory interpretation 
in Germany, can contain specific objectives of an enactment. If these objectives are 
inadvertently inconsistent with EU law, applying the presumption of compliance entails that 
an intention of the legislature to depart from the directive’s requirements will regularly not be 
clearly discernible. Relying on the presumption does not modify the double criterion; it does 
not shift the contra legem limit. However, it affects the double criterion as the element relating 
to the clearly identifiable intention of the legislature will regularly be absent. Applying the 
presumption of compliance thus significantly stretches the contra legem limit and de facto 
increases the power of the judiciary to find a consistent meaning. 
The relationship between national rules of construction and European methodological rules 
with regard to the contra legem limit is overlooked by scholars who assert that unambiguous 
                                                 
56 For a more critical view and the claim that the European presumption of compliance leads to a de facto and inadmissible 
shift of the national contra legem limit in Germany, see Schürnbrand, “Die Grenzen richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfortbildung 
im Privatrecht” (2007) JuristenZeitung 910, 912, 916-917. 
57 Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], judgment of 11 July 2012, (2012) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
3081 at [75] – Delisting; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 16 August 2006, (2006) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 3200 at [15]; Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 24 January 2006, (2006) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 862 at [43]; Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 24 September 2009, (2010) 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 557 at [38]. 
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statutory words do not bar the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation58 or who contend59 
that the clear and unambiguous wording of a provision functions as an absolute boundary. 
Either view confuses European requirements and limits of interpretation by virtue of domestic 
law. The CJEU has not yet decided whether clear and unambiguous statutory language of 
national legislation marks or does not mark the contra legem limit by virtue of European law. 
This question is decided by domestic law and national methodologies can differ between 
Member States. It is thus possible that the duty of consistent interpretation is applied 
differently. 
 
B. Exception to the contra legem limit for copy-out legislation? 
A recent CJEU ruling which merits further discussion is the Second Chamber judgment in the 
case of Spedition Welter.60 This judgment has tempted scholars to assert that the CJEU has 
extended the scope of the EU duty of consistent interpretation for copy-out legislation by 
requiring that such legislation must be interpreted in conformity with the applicable directive 
as construed by the CJEU regardless of whether it might be possible to do so or not under 
national law.61 The CJEU allegedly interfered with the contra legem limit. Copy-out legislation 
refers to national implementing legislation which adopts the same wording as that of the 
directive. The question that arose in the main proceedings was whether art. 21(5) of the Sixth 
Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 has to be construed as empowering a claims representative 
                                                 
58 Klamert, “Judicial implementation of directives and anticipatory indirect effect” (2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 1251, 1257. 
59 Opinion of A.G. Bot in Dansk Industri (C-441/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:776 at [68]; R. Schütze, European Union Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2015), p.400; cf. J. Stuyck and P. Wytinck, “Comment on Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentacion SA” (1991) 28 C.M.L. Rev. 205, 212. 
60 Spedition Welter (C-306/12) EU:C:2013:650. 
61 Franklin, “Limits to the limits of the principle of consistent interpretation?” (2015) 40 E.L. Rev. 910; Roth and Jopen, “§ 
13 Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung” in Europäische Methodenlehre (2015), § 13 at [34]. 
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of an insurance undertaking to accept service of judicial documents. The CJEU affirmed that 
question in Spedition Welter. S. 7b(2) of the German Law on the supervision of insurance 
transposed art. 21(5) of Directive 2009/103 and reproduced that provision virtually word for 
word. According to the CJEU, the domestic court is thus required, taking the whole body of 
domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by 
domestic law, to construe national law in a way that is compatible with the interpretation given 
to the directive by the CJEU.62 Advocate General Cruz Villalón asserted that if a domestic 
transposing provision uses the same form of words as the Union provision, “it is obvious” that 
the national provision “must be interpreted in the same way” as the Union provision.63 Yet, the 
Advocate General did not oblige the referring German court to adopt the same, i.e. European, 
principles of construction that the CJEU employs when it construes directives. Instead, the 
Advocate General declared that the referring court must undertake the interpretation of its 
domestic law in conformity with art. 21(5) of Directive 2009/103 by applying interpretative 
methods recognised by its legal order. It appeared to the Advocate General that the German 
law was open to a consistent interpretation according to German methods of statutory 
construction.64  
The very strong emphasis on the duty of consistent interpretation both in the Opinion 
of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court can be explained with the circumstances 
of the case. Even though the referring German court leaned towards the interpretation of art. 
21(5) of Directive 2009/103 which was later adopted by the CJEU, the German court did not 
examine whether the implementing provision, s. 7b(2) of the German Law on the supervision 
                                                 
62 Spedition Welter (C-306/12) EU:C:2013:650 at [32]. 
63 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Spedition Welter GmbH v Avanssur SA (C-306/12) ECLI:EU:C:2013:359 at [37]-[38]. 
64 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Spedition Welter GmbH v Avanssur SA (C-306/12) ECLI:EU:C:2013:359 at [39]-[42], 
particularly at [40]. 
24 of 36 
 
of insurance, was itself open to a consistent interpretation. It did not mention this provision at 
all in its judgment. Instead, it asserted in a rather cursory fashion that the wording of ss. 170 et 
seq. of the German Code of Civil Procedure leaves no scope for a consistent interpretation that 
empowers a claims representative of an insurance undertaking to accept service of judicial 
documents.65 Advocate General Cruz Villalón argued specifically against this reading of ss. 
170 et seq. in his Opinion in Spedition Welter and the view that these provisions could stand in 
the way of a consistent interpretation of s. 7b(2) of the German Law on the supervision of 
insurance.66 Furthermore, the German court did not consider the possibility of judicial law-
making in its ruling even though judicial law-making is a recognised technique of (consistent) 
statutory interpretation in Germany. In sum, the quality of the court’s reasoning was simply 
inadequate. 
It appears from these circumstances of the individual case that both the Advocate 
General and the CJEU intended to issue a warning to national courts that they must take 
seriously their obligation under the EU duty of consistent interpretation to fully exhaust their 
interpretative latitude and go to the outer limits of what is possible as a matter of statutory 
interpretation in order to find a directive-consistent meaning. Reading Spedition Welter in its 
context shows that the CJEU did not demand that copy-out legislation must be interpreted in 
conformity with the applicable directive as construed by the CJEU regardless of whether it 
might be possible to do so or not under national law. The CJEU did not require a contra legem 
interpretation of the German law. Spedition Welter leaves open the possibility that copy-out 
legislation is not amenable to a consistent interpretation in a specific case because a national 
                                                 
65 Landgericht [Regional Court] Saarbrücken, (2012) Neue Juristische Online Zeitschrift 1765 at [14]. 
66 When the case returned to the German court, the Landgericht Saarbrücken simply accepted that, in accordance with the 
guidance given by the CJEU, s. 7b(2) of the German Law on the supervision of insurance could be interpreted in conformity 
with art. 21(5) of Directive 2009/103. It did not even hint at a consistent interpretation of ss. 170 et seq. of the German Code 
of Civil Procedure. See Landgericht [Regional Court] Saarbrücken, (2015) Beck online Rechtsprechung 12283. 
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court reaches the contra legem limit of interpretation. Needless to say, the CJEU did not 
promote a common European methodology for the interpretation of copy-out legislation.  
Whether or not the warning issued to national courts will have its intended effect or 
indeed backfire is a more difficult question to answer. In the past, significantly gentler tones 
have been sufficient in order to nudge the German Federal Court of Justice to make 
interpretative U-turns. Heininger and Quelle are examples in point. In both cases, the referring 
German Federal Court of Justice felt unable to ascribe to the national law a meaning which, as 
it appeared after the decision of the CJEU, complied with the applicable directive. In neither 
case did the CJEU suggest to the national court that or how the national law is amenable to a 
consistent interpretation. Yet, when both cases returned to the German Federal Court of Justice, 
it reached a directive-compliant reading using national methods of interpretation.67 These two 
examples indicate that national courts leaning on the contra legem limit at the stage of referral 
should not be the prime concern of the CJEU.68 The main concern should be courts which do 
not refer because they (a) claim that the national law cannot be interpreted in conformity with 
the alleged meaning of a directive as suggested by one of the parties to the proceedings because 
such an interpretation would be contra legem and (b) at the same time assert, and rightly so for 
proceedings exclusively between private parties, that the provision of the directive at issue does 
                                                 
67 For Heininger see: Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], (2000) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 521, 521-522 – 
Heininger I; Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG (C-481/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-9945; [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 42; 
Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], (2002) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1881, 1882-1883 – Heininger II. For 
Quelle see: Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], (2006) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3200 at [10], [12] – Quelle 
I; Quelle AG v Bundesvreband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände (C-404/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-2685; [2008] 
2 C.M.L.R. 49; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], (2009) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 427 at [22]-[35] – Quelle 
II. 
68 For a recent example of an allegedly incorrect reliance on the contra legem limit by a national court see Dansk Industri (DI) 
v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen (C-441/14) ECLI:EU:C:2016:278; [2016] I.R.L.R. 552 and in particular Opinion of A.G. 
Bot in Dansk Industri (C-441/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:776 at [53]-[73]. 
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not have direct effect. In this scenario, the correct interpretation of the directive will often do 
not have any bearing on the decision of the dispute, which is why German courts in the past 
have declined to refer to the CJEU even though they admitted that they were unsure about the 
correct interpretation of the directive.69 It goes without saying that a refusal of national courts 
to cooperate with the CJEU by dodging the preliminary reference procedure seriously threatens 
the uniform interpretation and application of directives in the Member States. Whether the 
CJEU’s perceived interference with the exclusive competence of the national court to interpret 
national law and its hard-line approach to consistent interpretation in Spedition Welter will 
convince those courts to refer seems rather questionable. 
 
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN METHODOLOGICAL RULES 
AND NATIONAL LEGAL METHODOLOGIES 
The fact that the CJEU refers to national rules of construction for the principle of consistent 
interpretation but at the same time has developed European methodological rules appears to be 
contradictory at first glance. This paradox can be resolved, however, as the following 
explanation of the relationship between national legal methods and European methodological 
rules shows. The following concepts (overlapping, intervention and Europeanisation from the 
inside) describe different layers of this relationship. These concepts are not mutually exclusive 
categories but can coexist in a domestic legal order as they can apply at the level of specific 
interpretative rules. 
 
                                                 
69 See, e.g. Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 17 November 2009, (2010) Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht 1020 at [16], [26]-[27] – Urlaubsentgelt; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 16 May 2013, 
(2013) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2674 at [36], [39]-[43], [44]-[51]; German Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional Court] 
München, (2014) Neue Juristische Online Zeitschrift 204, 207. 
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A. Overlapping 
If judges achieve the result sought by the directive by using their national principles of statutory 
construction, they secure the full effectiveness of the directive and, therefore, do not need to 
use European methodological rules. This is supported by the wording of art. 288(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which grants national authorities 
“the choice of form and methods”. National and European rules can overlap. Overlapping 
includes the situation where the substance of a European methodological rule is fully part of 
national principles of construction. In other words, a twin exists in domestic law. Two variants 
of this twin can be distinguished. Either it is already part of national legal methodology or it 
enters the domestic legal order due to a deliberate process of change. The latter case warrants 
elaboration.  
Even though Member States are not required to integrate European methodological 
rules into their legal system such that the former are mirrored in national law, the European 
rules are not opposed to such an internalisation based on domestic law. This internalisation is 
primarily the task of the national judiciary. It is advantageous for two reasons. First, the scope 
of possible conflicts and inconsistencies between national and European rules of interpretation 
is reduced. Second, judges in Member States may be more likely to accept and correctly apply 
a methodological standard if it is rooted in the domestic legal system. Internalising a European 
rule creates a twin in domestic law and justifies the interpretative standard by virtue of Member 
State law. This process does not affect the autonomous status of the EU rules or the jurisdiction 
of the CJEU to pronounce on any question involving the interpretative obligations arising under 
the EU duty of consistent interpretation. As with other cases of overlapping, European and 
national methodological rules still exist side-by-side but they are drawing nearer to each other. 
If the substance of a European methodological rule is part of national principles of 
construction, the relationship between domestic law and EU rules can be described as follows. 
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Even though there is an agreement about the content of the interpretative standard in the Union, 
some Member States may derive it from domestic law, whereas others may derive it from EU 
law. Different claims exist in the Union with regard to the same methodological content, which 
can either be attributed to the European legal order or the domestic legal order. These rival 
claims can coexist. They are not irreconcilable as they do not make competing claims over the 
legal basis of the same legal rule, but over the legal bases of different rules with the same 
content. Either domestic law claims legitimacy over a national principle of construction; or 
European law claims legitimacy over a European methodological rule.70 The overlapping of 
European and national rules for the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation can be described 
as legal pluralism that exists within the European legal duty of consistent interpretation.71 
Legal pluralism is understood here as referring to the coexistence of legal orders or single rules, 
which are rooted in different sources of legitimacy, in the same social field.72 
Examples of overlapping can be found in English and German judgments. English 
courts apply a presumption that Parliament intends to give effect to the UK’s international 
                                                 
70 We are not here concerned with the competing constitutional claims that the ultimate authority for the applicability of the 
European legal duty of consistent interpretation and European methodological rules in the Member States lies (a) in the 
European legal order or (b) in national constitutions. On the plurality of ultimate authority claims in the EU see, e.g. B. de 
Witte, “Direct effect, primacy, and the nature of the legal order” in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The evolution of EU law, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p.323 at pp.350-357. 
71 For the distinction between pluralism within a legal order and between legal orders see J. Bacquero Cruz in M. Avelj and J. 
Komárek, “Four visions of constitutional pluralism (symposium transcript)” (2008) 2 European Journal of Legal Studies 323, 
330. 
72 M. Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p.107. For an introduction to legal pluralism see J. Griffiths, “What 
is legal pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism, 1-56; specifically with regard to the methods of legal reasoning in 
Europe and a European pluralist methodology J. Husa, “The method is dead, long live the methods – European polynomia and 
pluralist methodology” (2011) 5 Legisprudence 249-271. 
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obligations fully and consistently.73 It is apparent from this formulation of the English 
presumption that a considerable overlap exists with the EU presumption of compliance. Within 
the parameters of the overlap, an English court can apply the English presumption (that is to 
say, conventional principles of construction) when interpreting legislation in conformity with 
an applicable directive without having recourse to the EU methodological rule. In Germany, 
the Federal Court of Justice gave priority to the presumed general intention of the legislature 
to fully transpose Directive 1999/44/EC into domestic law over an inadvertently inconsistent 
objective of a particular enactment, which was expressed in the implementing statute’s 
legislative history.74 The court used national legal methodology to achieve this result and did 
not refer to the EU presumption of compliance. 
 
B. Intervention 
European methodological rules can intervene in national legal methodologies. A court must 
apply the European rules if they permit a consistent interpretation of legislation and if the court 
cannot reach the result sought by the directive by applying domestic standards alone. In this 
scenario, the European rules increase the scope for interpretation available to a judge. These 
rules do not simply add a separate and standalone layer to the interpretative process. The EU 
presumption of compliance interacts with the historical and purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation. Therefore, national principles of construction may need to adapt to the 
presumption rule in order to guarantee its effective operation. This adaptation is itself required 
                                                 
73 Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 A.C. 751 (House of Lords), 771 (Lord Diplock); Assange v Swedish 
Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22 at [122] (Lord Dyson), at [201] (Lord Mance); R (JS) v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 at [239] (Lord Kerr). 
74 Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 21 December 2011, (2012) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1073 
at [34] – Weber II. 
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by EU law as domestic law must be interpreted in accordance with primary EU law (EU 
methodological rules). If an adaptation is necessary but proves impossible, the national 
standard must be disapplied. Just as the supremacy of the EU legal duty of consistent 
interpretation renders inapplicable a national prohibition of consistent interpretation, national 
principles of construction which contradict European methodological rules are disapplied in 
case of conflict. 
Through the processes of intervention and overlapping (in the form of internalisation), 
European methodological rules impact on the coevolution of networked legal systems.75 They 
advance the convergence of national principles of construction which are applied to consistent 
interpretation. This occurrence may further increase the convergence of national legal 
methodologies as applied in purely domestic scenarios if the interpretative tools available for 
consistent construction spill over to national legal methods employed outside the European 
context.76 
It is worth asking the question whether the adaptation of national principles of 
construction to the EU presumption of compliance was overlooked by the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales in Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure. Even though 
the case fell within the ambit of the European presumption of compliance as described in this 
article, the court did not apply this presumption. In that case, the legislative history of the 
                                                 
75 Cf. for this effect of the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation M. Amstutz, “In-between worlds: Marleasing and the 
emergence of interlegality in legal reasoning” (2005) 11 E.L.J. 766, 768-769. 
76 A. Johnston, “'Spillovers' from EU law into national law: (un)intended consequences for private law relationships” in D. 
Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds.), The involvement of EU law in private law relationships (Oxford: OUP, 2013), p.357 at 
pp.385-387 describes “spillover effects” of the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation to English national legal methods. In 
contrast, T. Hervey and N. Sheldon, “Judicial method of English courts and tribunals in EU law cases: a case study in 
employment law” in U. Neergaard and R. Nielsen and L.M. Roseberry (eds.), European Legal Method – Paradoxes and 
Revitalisation (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2011), p.327 at p.375 cannot discern such spillover effects. 
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Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, which were intended to implement the 
Information Society Directive, revealed two contradictory intentions of the government:77 (a) 
the specific intention not to alter the ambit of s. 72(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 and to maintain to the fullest extent possible the existing exceptions to copyright 
infringement and (b) the general intention to fully implement the Information Society Directive 
with the 2003 Regulations. The Court of Appeal gave precedence to the former over the latter. 
The court also acknowledged that the government was mistaken as to the ambit of s. 72(1), i.e. 
that the specific intention of the government was inadvertently inconsistent with the 
Information Society Directive. The Court of Appeal’s omission to apply the priority element 
of the EU presumption of compliance was not, however, material to the outcome of the case. 
That is because the court’s supporting considerations exhibit an outer limit of consistent 
interpretation under English law, which rebuts the presumption: adopting the proposed 
consistent meaning would have resulted in making a policy choice which would have involved 
issues calling for legislative deliberation and which would have involved far-reaching practical 
repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate.78 
 
C. Europeanisation from the inside 
If a court intends to achieve the full effectiveness of directives through an interpretation of 
domestic law, it may consider extending the scope of permissible judicial reasoning for 
consistent interpretation beyond existing national principles of construction and beyond the 
requirements of European methodological rules. Whether or not this is possible is determined 
by Member State law; it is referred to here as a “Europeanisation from the inside”. The notion 
of Europeanisation from the inside particularly captures the question of whether domestic 
                                                 
77 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] EWCA Civ 1708 at [50]-[52] (Etherton LJ). 
78 See Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] EWCA Civ 1708 at [55], [57] (Etherton LJ). 
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courts have gone further than required by the CJEU for consistent interpretation.79 For instance, 
courts could decide to apply the European presumption of compliance to cases which lie 
outside CJEU case law on its scope of application, e.g. to legislation pre-dating an applicable 
directive even if the Wagner Miret exception is not met.80 In the House of Lords, Lord Oliver 
has embraced a Europeanisation from the inside in Pickstone when he construed s. 1(2)(c) 
Equal Pay Act 1970 in conformity with the Equal Pay Directive by reading additional words 
into the provision. He said that “so to construe a provision which, on its face, is unambiguous 
involves a departure from a number of well-established rules of construction.”81 
The process of Europeanisation from the inside can also impact on the national 
separation of powers if a domestic court surpasses the existing limits of interpretation and 
thereby shifts the contra legem limit in favour of the judiciary specifically for consistent 
interpretation. Whether or not this widening of the judicial function is legitimate is for national 
constitutional law to decide. In Germany, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
dismissed such a Europeanisation from the inside. It has clarified that the outer techniques and 
limits of consistent interpretation must not exceed those of conventional judicial law-making 
in a purely domestic context.82 
 
                                                 
79 Lord Mance, The interface between national and European law, (2013) 38 E.L. Rev. 437, 450 raises this question with regard 
to UK law. 
80 See Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 24 March 2009, (2009) Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 465 at [58]-[59], [67] – Schultz-Hoff. In Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labour Court], judgment of 17 
November 2009, (2010) Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1020 – Urlaubsentgelt, however, the Bundesarbeitsgericht did not 
apply the EU presumption of compliance in a similar scenario and thus seems to have departed from its earlier position in 
Schultz-Hoff. 
81 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66 (House of Lords), 126 (Lord Oliver).  
82 Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], judgment of 26 September 2011, (2012) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 669 at [46]. 
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6. CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION AS A HYBRID METHOD 
As the relationship between national and European interpretative rules shows, the methodology 
for consistent interpretation integrates a top-down and a bottom-up approach.83 This 
methodology is neither solely domestic nor European but bears elements of both legal orders. 
Therefore, the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation is, according to its methodological 
design, a hybrid legal instrument.84 Hybridity here means “that the legal character of the 
respective rule is neither European nor national; it bears elements of both legal orders”.85 
Although the doctrine of consistent interpretation includes European rules as binding signposts 
for domestic courts, the principles of construction in different Member States can deviate from 
each other within this relatively unified framework. This design of the doctrine also provides 
an example of a bounded internal European legal pluralism. The legal pluralism is bounded as 
it is restricted by EU methodological rules. In terms of (global) pluralism theory, diversity is 
restrained in order not to be overly disruptive to uniformity. It is possible to speak of “ordered 
pluralism”.86 
                                                 
83 Cf. for the combination of a top-down and a bottom-up approach as an expression of the pluralistic conception of the 
European legal order M.P. Maduro, “Contrapunctual law: Europe’s constitutional pluralism in action” in N. Walker (ed.), 
Sovereignty in transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003), p.501 at p.522. 
84 M. Hesselink, “A European legal method? On European private law and scientific method” (2009) 15 E.L.J. 20, 40, 42 
claims that a hybrid method should apply to the interpretation of national law transposing EU directives, but he does not 
provide any further details about such a hybrid method. For criticism of hybrid conceptions of the EU legal duty of consistent 
interpretation see Chalmers and Davies and Monti, European Union Law (2014), p.320. 
85 H. Micklitz, “Monistic ideology versus pluralistic reality: towards a normative design for European private law” in L. 
Niglia (ed.), Pluralism and European private law (Oxford: Hart, 2013), p.29 at p.47. For an explanation of the concept of 
hybridisation of legal phenomena see K. Tuori, “Transnational law: on legal hybrids and perspectivism” in M.P. Maduro and 
K. Tuori and S. Sankari (eds.), Transnational law: Rethinking European law and legal thinking (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 
p.11 at pp.14-23. 
86 For the concept of “ordered pluralism” see M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering pluralism: a conceptual analysis for understanding 
the transnational legal world (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), pp.13-14. 
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The hybrid conception of the doctrine recognises, at least to a certain extent, the 
autonomy and diversity of national cultures as judges can still employ their specific legal 
culture (traditions of interpretation). It builds on the presumption that legal cultures in Member 
States are not static and may evolve87 based on a European harmonisation programme but at 
the same time also accommodates sceptical voices88 that suggest that legal cultures in Europe 
may not converge. This respect for diversity also manifests itself in the concept of overlapping. 
Accommodating the different domestic legal orders may also increase the effectiveness of EU 
law.89 It is not a given that a hybrid methodology will underperform a completely unified 
European methodology for consistent interpretation on the scoreboard of the effectiveness of 
directives. A hybrid methodology reduces the chances of actual conflict between legal orders 
and arguably increases the acceptance of EU methodological rules within domestic legal 
orders. A hybrid methodology is a dynamic90 compromise between the effectiveness of EU law 
on the one hand and national autonomy over the rules of interpretation of domestic law on the 
other hand. It is the result of a tension between uniformity and diversity which exists in other 
                                                 
87 J. Hage, “Legal reasoning and legal integration” (2010) 10 M.J. 67, 95; C. Lyons, “Perspectives on convergence within the 
theatre of European integration” in P. Beaumont and C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds.), Convergence and divergence in 
European public law (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p.79 at pp.84-85. 
88 P. Legrand, “European legal systems are not converging” (1996) 45 I.C.L.Q. 52-81. See also C. Harlow, “Voices of 
difference in a plural community” (2002) 50 A.J.C.L. 339, 347-348; G. Teubner, “Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or 
how unifying law ends up in new divergencies” (1998) 61 M.L.R. 11, 12. 
89 For this effect of EU internal legal pluralism see G.T. Davies, “Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for 
pluralism” in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond (Oxford: Hart, 
2012), p.269 at p.272. 
90 P.S. Berman, “Global legal pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155, 1236 describes the reality of global 
legal pluralism as one where answers to the question whether pluralism should be honoured and occasions when it should be 
trumped are transient and never final. 
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areas of EU law as well91 and which ultimately originates from the constitutional heart of the 
EU as a supranational institution “united in diversity”92. For some, such a hybrid methodology 
may represent the best theoretically available compromise.93 
It is also possible to speak of a dialogue or a cooperative relationship between the CJEU 
and domestic courts regarding the methods of consistent interpretation, which requires 
concessions from both sides: the CJEU must accept different interpretative traditions in the 
Member States and national courts must accept the CJEU’s concerns in respect of safeguarding 
the full effectiveness and uniform application of directives. This dialogue arises from the 
mutual obligation of cooperation between the Union and Member States enshrined in art. 4(3) 
TEU,94 a provision which functions as one element of the legal basis for the EU legal duty of 
consistent interpretation. In sum, the legal methodology of consistent interpretation shows 
typical features95 of interlegality: overlapping, interpenetration and dialogue. Interlegality 
                                                 
91 Consider the tension between the effective legal protection of rights granted by EU law and national procedural autonomy; 
see M. Dougan, National remedies before the Court of Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2004), pp.65-67. 
92 Whether or not this tension originates from the constitutional heart of the EU is heavily contested. The preamble of the 
TFEU refers to an “ever closer Union”; a notion which seems to prioritise convergence over divergence, uniformity over 
diversity. For a detailed discussion of the matter see Dougan, National remedies before the Court of Justice (2004), chapters 
2-4. 
93 Cf. Berman, “Global legal pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155, 1165 for the thesis that a pluralistic 
design of procedural legal mechanisms and institutions in a globalised world is the best available compromise between 
universalist and territorialist positions. Cf. E. Cloots, National identity in EU law (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp.121-123, who 
argues that both integration and accommodation of national diversity should be striven for by the Union institutions as a 
regulative ideal. 
94 On the mutual duty of cooperation see Roquette Frères v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes (C-94/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-9011; [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 1 at [31]-[32]; Klamert, The principle of loyalty in 
EU law (2014), pp.25-28. 
95 See Tuori, “Transnational law” in Transnational law (2014), p.11 at p.44. On the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation 
and the emergence of interlegality in legal reasoning see also Amstutz, “In-between worlds” (2005) 11 E.L.J. 766. 
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means that a blending of elements of different legal orders (here national and EU law) occurs.96 
Interlegality is a result of legal pluralism and leads to hybridity. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article merged the fragments of a European methodological standard for consistent 
interpretation from the case law of the CJEU into a coherent framework labelled European 
methodological rules. These rules apply together with national legal methods and also interact 
with them via the concepts of overlapping, intervention and Europeanisation from the inside. 
Based on this relationship between European and national methodological rules, the article 
argued that the doctrine of consistent interpretation possesses a hybrid methodology. The 
article thus demonstrated how the European and the national elements of the EU principle of 
consistent interpretation work together in practice and provided for the theoretical 
underpinnings of this relationship. Judgments by English and German courts were used to 
illustrate whether and how domestic courts apply and accept European methodological rules. 
The reanalysis of the CJEU’s case law offered answers to some unresolved methodological 
questions. The article showed how consistent interpretation impacts on national methods of 
statutory interpretation. It also demonstrated to what extent judges are required to depart from 
traditional principles of construction and to what extent European methodological rules 
broaden the limits of the judicial function as accepted under domestic law. The contra legem 
limit was defined and some of its misinterpretations in existing scholarship were highlighted. 
                                                 
96 On the concept of interlegality see B. de Sousa Santos, “Law: a map of misreading. Toward a postmodern conception of 
law” (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 279, 297-298. 
